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 Benemar Benatta, detained shortly after the September 11 attacks, after his 2006 release. The former Algerian air force lieutenant was locked up the longest of the
 post-September 11 detainees. nathan denette/ap photo/cp
 The Bush administration promised not to "single out" Arabs and Muslims with its post-September 11 anti-terrorism
 measures, but in practice it did exactly that. These measures signaled to Arabs and Muslims in the US, citizens
 and non-citizens alike, that American legal protections did not really apply to them. And they yielded precious
 little in the way of fighting terrorism.
 Within 24 hours of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the
 Bush administration had announced the identities of
 the alleged perpetrators, all but one dead, and had
 largely reconstructed the plot as it understood it. In short order
 the administration put forth the notion that another such
 attack was imminent and authorized immediate, aggressive
 law enforcement and domestic anti-terrorism actions. These
 activities were justified with statements such as this from
 Attorney General John Ashcroft: "Today's terrorists enjoy the
 benefits of our free society even as they commit themselves
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 to our destruction. T y live in our communities?plotting,
 planning and waiting to kill Americans again."
 In practice, government agencies focused their efforts on a
 particular set of persons and institutions, those of Arabs and
 Muslims living in the United States, where, they argued, the
 threat lay under deep co r, ready to strike anew. This assess
 ment was based ot on any particular knowledge but on its
 absence, and reflected more than anything the government's
 wn past failures. To compensate for these failures, Arabs and
 Muslims in the US wer  placed, en masse, under a security
 spotlight. As Nixon Center policy analyst Robert Leiken so
 aptly put it, "if the needle resists discovery," go for the haystack,
 although in this case the needle had already been threaded.1
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 The idea that Arab and Muslim terrorists were hiding in
 America under a veneer of normalcy, just waiting to attack,
 struck fear into the hearts of Americans. Bush administration
 statements were clear, calling fear to action: "The federal
 government cannot fight this reign of terror alone. Every
 American must help us defend our nation against this enemy/'
 Americans quickly came to view Arab and Muslims in the
 US?citizens, permanent residents and visitors alike?with
 suspicion. Since terrorists were alleged to be Arabs and
 Muslims posing as normal persons residing inconspicuously
 in "our communities," close observation of them was not only
 necessary but also possessed of an air of patriotism. Arabs and
 Muslims spoke of a persistent feeling of being watched, of
 feeling that such actions as opening a car trunk, checking the
 mail or making an overseas phone call were subject to wild
 reinterpretation. In turn, Arabs and Muslims expended extra
 effort to convince spectators of their innocence and innocuous
 ness. Whether or not each Arab and Muslim living in the US
 was in fact watched, most of them understood that, in the new
 panoptical world, they were under somebody's surveillance,
 and conducted their daily lives accordingly.
 As a result of the heightened focus on Arabs and Muslims,
 Ashcroft could declare on September 18, 2001, one week after
 the attacks: "To date the FBI has received more than 96,000
 tips and potential leads: more than 54,000 on the website,
 nearly 9,000 on the hot line, the toll-free WATTS line, and
 more than 33,000 leads that were generated in the FBI field
 offices." Each lead required an FBI or law enforcement visit to
 a worksite or home. WTiile it is now clear that these interviews
 produced little useful information, at the time they suggested
 to onlookers that the subject bore some measure of guilt, even
 if by association. They fed into the notion that Arabs and
 Muslims were people who, if not terrorists themselves, could
 be harboring terrorists or covering up their knowledge of
 brewing terrorist plots. The interviews stigmatized Arabs and
 Muslims because bystanders likely presumed that something
 serious, something more than a name, a skin color, a phone
 call or a manner of dress, had spurred the visit.
 The suspicions were unwarranted. As former FBI counter
 terrorism agent Michael Rolince told the 2005 Muslim Public
 Affairs Council convention, after "about half a million FBI
 interviews...I'm not aware, and I know 9/11 about as well as
 anybody in the FBI knows 9/11.. .of any single person in your
 community who had they stepped forward could have provided
 a clue to help us get out in front of this. The reality of that attack
 is that 19 people came here with what they needed."2 Arabs and
 Muslims in the US would endure much more than interviews
 before the pressure on their communities would be lessened.
 Visa Violators Are Terrorists
 Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa?even
 by one day?we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be
 put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. We will use every
 available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage. We
 will use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution
 to protect life and enhance security for America.... Some will ask
 whether a civilized nation?a nation of law and not of men?can
 use the law to defend itself from barbarians and remain civilized. Our
 answer, unequivocally, is "yes." Yes, we will defend civilization.
 ?Attorney General John Ashcroft
 Substituting "Arab and Muslim male non-citizens" where the
 word "terrorists" appears in Ashcroft's speech of October 25,
 2001 provides a proximate rendering of other anti-terrorism
 policies in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and certainly
 the way Arab and Muslim men perceived them. Invoking
 the language of the "clash of civilizations," this statement
 equates terrorists and barbarians with visa violators and local
 lawbreakers, Arab and Muslim male non-citizens providing the
 unmentioned link between the categories. A close reading of
 Ashcroft's language in the passage below locates the discursive
 trick in its fuzzy definition of "the law," positioning of the word
 "or" and linkage of this blurred language to terrorists:
 In the war on terror, this Department of Justice will arrest and detain
 any suspected terrorist who has violated the law. Our single objective is
 to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off the street.
 If suspects are found not to have links to terrorism or not to have
 violated the law, they are released. But terrorists who are in violation
 of the law will be convicted, in some cases deported, and in all cases
 prevented from doing further harm to Americans.
 In the next paragraph, Ashcroft is able to use this vague
 language to claim nearly 1,000 terrorist arrests, proving that
 the government was keeping Americans safe.
 Within days of the September 11 attacks, we launched this anti
 terrorism offensive to prevent new attacks on our homeland. To date,
 our anti-terrorism offensive has arrested or detained nearly 1,000
 individuals as part of the September 11 terrorism investigation. Those
 who violated the law remain in custody. Taking suspected terrorists
 in violation of the law off the streets and keeping them locked up is
 our clear strategy to prevent terrorism within our borders.
 In fact, these detainees were overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim
 men who were arrested on the basis of looks, national origins
 or reports of suspicion, as well as not being able to prove at the
 moment of contact with police that their presence in the US
 was legal. Human Rights Watch's conclusion that "being a male
 Muslim non-citizen from certain countries became a proxy for
 suspicious behavior" highlights the primary use of stereotypes
 and phenotypes in government actions. Ditto the public, as
 the human rights organization found that some men were
 incarcerated "simply because spouses, neighbors or members of
 the public said they were 'suspicious' or accused them without
 any credible basis of being terrorists."3 Some men were arrested
 because they were seen in rental cars, taking photos at tourist
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 Safa al-Habash and tier son Basil, 10, sip a Father's Day card to protest the plight of fathers who had been deported or were facing deportation due to post-September 11
 immigration measures. mario tama/getty images
 sites or with World Trade Center postcards taped to the counters
 of their delis. These men were held in high-security detention
 while the government looked for charges, unable to secure
 their release until a range of government agencies could prove
 without a doubt that they were not terrorists?a time-consuming
 process after which visa violators were deported. Human Rights
 Watch concluded: "Operating behind a wall of secrecy, the US
 Department of Justice thrust scores of Muslim men living in the
 United States into a Kafkaesque world of indefinite detention
 without charges and baseless accusations of terrorist links."4 The
 arrests were aggressive, due process was denied and detainees
 endured verbal abuse, psychological pressure and physical
 deprivation, according to the investigations of Human Rights
 Watch and the Justice Departments Office of the Inspector
 General. Some detainees experienced recurring strip searches
 and intentional physical cruelty. By 2003 it was assumed that
 most of these men had been released and that at least 500 were
 deported, but it was hard to know for sure since the government
 has never released their identities. The government netted not a
 single terrorist suspect from this operation.
 FBI interviews, mass arrests, deportations of visa violators
 and detentions of "material witnesses" were supplemented by
 a host of other tactics that included widespread wiretapping,
 closing down Muslim charities and freezing their assets, eaves
 dropping on attorney-client conversations, property seizures,
 the "special registration" and fingerprinting of more than
 80,000 male foreign nationals from Arab and Muslim-majority
 coun ries, and reviews of private Internet, telecommunication
 and financial recor s, secured through more than 30,000
national security letters issued annually to American businesses
 after the passage of the USA Patriot Act* Over time, the govern
ment initiated a few hu dred cases against persons charged with
 espionag  and a range of terrorism-related offenses.
 Each Bush administration tactic was announced by the
 government and covered by the media as a "new development"
in the fight against omestic terrorism, so that whether it actu
 ally nabbed any terrorist  did not matter. The mere existence of
 the e continuing efforts generated a sense that an aggressive and
 competent bureaucracy wa  rooting out a genuine domestic threat.
 M anwhile, these measures signaled to Arabs and Muslims in the
 US, citizens and non-citizens alike, that American legal protec
 tions were easily circumvented and did not apply to them. When
 the administration was cri icized on this point, its spokespersons
 would argue that this was indeed the objective?to incite fear
 in these communities in order to destabilize plotters. Despite
 President George W Bushs September 20, 2001 statement that
 "no one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind
 words because of their ethnic background or religious faith," his
 administrations ost-September 11 policies did precisely that.
 Report Card
 These extrao dina y efforts, characterized by legal scholar
 David Cole as "the most aggressive nat onal ca p ign of
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 ethnic profiling since World War II,"
 uncovered few terrorists.5 Not a single
 one of the 80,000 Arabs and Muslims
 who were required to register with the
 government because they were in the US
 on temporary visas was convicted of a
 terrorist charge. The same holds true for
 some 5,000 preventive detentions and
 tens of thousands of FBI interviews. The
 Bush administration said it had located
 terrorist cells in Detroit, Portland, Seattle,
 northern Virginia and Lackawanna, New
 York, but a close look at these cases shows
 that none of these groups were proven to
 have plans to inflict damage on the US.
 Only one of these groups, the Lackawanna
 Six, had an al-Qaeda connection. This
 group of young Yemeni-American men
 was not a new discovery at all; they had
 been reported to the FBI months before
 the September 11 attacks by an Arab
 Muslim neighbor, who had learned of their
 plans to join an al-Qaeda training camp in
 Afghanistan. Shortly after arriving at the
 camp in the spring of 2001, some of the
 boys fled in fear, wanting nothing to do with what was going on
 there, while others finished training and later returned home.6
 Resuming their lives in Lackawanna under FBI observation
 and wiretapping, they did nothing materially suspicious and
 evinced no sign that they ever had plans to stage an attack. Yet
 when they were arrested in September 2002, they were heralded
 as the Bush administration's key homegrown terrorist find.
 The government's success with criminal indictments in
 "terrorism-related" cases fared only somewhat better. As of
 2005, more than 400 post-September 11 "terrorism-related"
 indictments had produced some 200 convictions.7 In fact,
 only 39 of these "terrorism-related" cases resulted in convic
 tions on terrorism charges, and the majority of these were for
 "support" of a terrorist group (encompassing a wide range of
 non-criminal activities). An analysis conducted in 2003 by the
 Syracuse-based Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
 found that the median sentence handed down in cases the
 Justice Department identified as "terrorism-related" was 14
 days, hardly evidence of a terrorist catch. In 2005, New York
 University's Center on Law and Security reviewed the "terror
 related" cases and found "almost no convictions on charges
 reflecting dangerous crimes." Some have argued that the
 government's anti-terrorism measures had deterrent value, but
 as with the death penalty, any such value cannot, by definition,
 be measured.
 The Treasury Department closed six Muslim charities and
 made it a crime to engage in transactions with them. No
 charges were filed against three of the six, and criminal charges
 were brought and then dropped against two, with only the
 I Deportations Before and After September 11
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 Deportation ("removal") orders issued for people from countries covered by the Justice
 Department's "special registration" program launched on September 11,2002. Increases
 were evident for many countries, not only Arab or Muslim countries. Chart does not include
 data for Bahrain, Libya, Oman and Qatar. Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office
 of Immigration Statistics.
 Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development eventually
 being charged with financing terrorism. Irrespective of these
 differences, the assets of all were frozen. Under an executive
 order, the government was not required to produce evidence
 supporting these closures. As a result of these actions, needy
 recipients in the Muslim world were largely cut off from the
 charity of American Muslims. Repeated requests to the US
 government to allow the transfer of these charities' assets to
 agencies of which it approved were denied. In October 2007 a
 jury acquitted the Holy Land Foundation and its directors of all
 of the 197 criminal violations related to funding terrorism. In
 the meantime, however, fears concerning financial transactions,
 whether sending remittances to family members back home or
 charitable giving, were high among Arabs and Muslims. Under
 the Patriot Act, charitable giving could now be prosecuted
 as support for terrorism. Charities remaining open received
 substantially fewer donations at precisely the time they were
 needed to support the mobilizations required to defend Arab
 and Muslim civil rights.
 The government's actions and unsubstantiated claims, and
 the sensationalist media coverage that accompanied each, had
 other punitive outcomes. They stoked public fear and granted
 the government the leeway it needed to sidestep the rule of
 law. The production of 96,000 tips within seven days of the
 attacks highlights the fact that the public response to Arabs and
 Muslims was based on preexisting stereotypes. Government
 statements of threat and pleas for help needed no backup
 documentation, as they leveraged social understandings about
 Arabs and Muslims that were already widely held. These
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 narratives and stereotypes allowed the government excesses
 after September n to occur because they provided a context in
 which the government needed to prove little, and paved the way
 for the symbolic reconstitution of Arabs and Muslims as people
 who were not part of the American nation. Since "they" threat
 ened "our" communities, it was easy to render them ineligible
 for the full package of American civil and constitutional rights.
 Poll after poll, along with flag waving in front of mosques and
 in Arab-American neighborhoods, showed substantial public
 support for depriving Arabs and Muslims of civil liberties. In
 fact, Arabs and Muslims were often described as persons who
 moved to the US just to take advantage of these very rights in
 order to carry out their plots of destruction.
 Despite the dragnet tactics, a cooperative citizenry, secret
 evidence and secret hearings, the government s allegation that
 Arab and Muslim terrorists were lurking in Arab and Muslim
 American communities, "plotting, planning and waiting to
 kill Americans," was never proven correct. Nonetheless, these
 measures delivered a frightening world for Arabs and Muslims
 living in the US. In fact, it was the near ioo percent rate of false
 positives that exacerbated their anxiety because it produced
 an understanding that, for them, anything goes. One did
 not need to be guilty of any wrongdoing to be turned in by a
 neighbor, visited by the FBI, pulled off an airplane, denied a
 bank account, detained, arrested, incarcerated or charged.
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 The Road Ahead
 It was precisely such excesses by the Bush administration in
 addition to violent public backlash against Arab and Muslim
 Americans that set in motion the dialectic of social change.
 Arab and Muslim Americans recognized the challenge
 before them rather quickly after the September n attacks
 and vigorously stepped up to defend their rights. And they
 were not alone.
 The coalitions that emerged to defend Arab and Muslim
 Americans effectively transformed their status in many US loca
 tions from "outsider" or "unknown" communities to engaged and
 known ones. Over time, Arab and Muslim Americans became
 more deeply woven into the fabric of an extensive range of
 American activist, policy and watchdog organizations and many
 of their own community and faith-based organizations became
 stronger. Philanthropists and foundations formerly reluctant to
 support Arab and Muslim American organizations came forward
 with financial support after September n because emergency
 circumstances outweighed normative pressures to hold back.
 This material support, in turn, bolstered Arab and Muslim
 American institution building and leadership development. All
 of these positive social changes make it now far more politically
 difficult than in the first few years after the September n attacks
 for the US government to implement policies that openly and
 visibly target Arab and Muslim Americans en masse.
 The post-September n experience for Arab and Muslim
 Americans thus reveals a paradoxical historical moment. At the
 same time that members of these groups experienced extensive
 institutional discrimination, government targeting (mainly
 focused on men) and public attacks (largely focused on women
 and Islamic religious institutions), they also experienced
 enhanced civic inclusion. This civic inclusion is by no means
 evenly distributed across the nation, nor is it uncontested, but
 it is measurable nonetheless. This perhaps unexpected positive
 outcome emerged from the dialectic put into motion when
 state repression, public attacks and popular vilification became
 intolerable to many. The work of countless groups left a hand
 print on the post-September n Arab and Muslim American
 story: human rights organizations investigating abuses of
 prisoners; philanthropies supporting community defense work;
 civil rights attorneys defending the falsely accused; immigrant
 coalitions marching in protest against government excesses;
 Japanese American and other ethnic organizations calling for
 an end to profiling; community organizers conducting civil
 rights teach-ins and special registration monitoring; mosques
 organizing open houses; neighborhood organizations forming
 mosque defense committees; inter-faith groups speaking out
 against hate crimes; schoolgirls exchanging solidarity visits; and
 local and national Arab and Muslim American organizations
 taking on a broader range of tasks than ever before.
 Still, nativist voices keep alive a countervailing social impulse
 that Arab and Muslim Americans need to remain as "outsiders"
 in American society because they are persons "who cannot be
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 trusted to live by the rules." These are not isolated individuals,
 but include elected officials, candidates for office and media
 personalities. Charges of Muslim American disloyalty were
 part of a number of 2008 political campaigns, in some cases
 sparking the criminalization and return of Muslim American
 campaign donations.8 A 2007 presidential primary advertise
 ment for Republican Rudy Giuliani referred to Muslims as "a
 people perverted." The most substantial resurgence of nativism,
 however, occurred during the 2008 general election campaign,
 when anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments were mobilized to
 sow fear of (now) President-elect Barack Obama, who, although
 not Muslim, is the biological son of a Muslim man. Long-time
 Rep. Ray LaHood (R-IL) told WGN radio on October 10, 2008
 that, while he supported the Republican presidential ticket, he
 was profoundly dismayed by crowds shouting "Kill him!" and
 "Terrorist!" when Obama's name was mentioned during rallies
 for GOP vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin.
 Although they continue to face structural barriers of race
 and religious difference, Arab and Muslim Americans enter
 the future in a better socio-political position than that they
 occupied on September 11, 2001. At a minimum, their height
 ened social and civic engagement should provide them with
 better protection from attack and mass arrest should another
 event occur that some might use to assign collective responsi
 bility. Theoretically, the relationships are in place to block the
 major assaults on their civil rights and safety that occurred
 during the Bush years. It is unfortunately the case, however,
 that these very changes in Arab and Muslim American social
 status have exposed the segments of American society that rely
 on anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments to promote their
 own interests. While these groups existed before September
 11, it was then that they were able to capitalize on the public's
 lack of knowledge and on Arab and Muslim social exclusion
 to get their message across. Well-organized, well-financed and
 invested in inciting fear, they continue to rely on strife in the
 Middle East to make their claims. As long as arguments that
 Arabs and Muslims are fundamentally different from "us" are
 socially tolerated in the United States, whether referring to
 people at home or abroad, it is difficult to pronounce that the
 road ahead will be smooth for Arab and Muslim Americans.
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